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COMMENTS
FREE SPEECH, DUE PROCESS - AND CONTEMPT
GORDON L WALGREN
The power of a court to punish summarily for contempt has been
likened to be "the nearest [thing] akin to despotic power of any power
existing under our form of government."' On the other hand, it has
been praised as an inherent necessity if the courts are to exercise their
functions properly.' The balancing of these two considerations has
perplexed the courts which have dealt with the contempt cases as they
have come up through the years; that is, whether to limit the power,
thereby possibly sacrificing judicial decorum and standing, or to allow
it to remain unlimited as an assurance of continuing dignity in all
judicial proceedings. A recent decision of the Supreme Court of Wyo-
ming, Application of Stone,' seems certain to raise a storm of comment
across the country. The facts are extremely interesting and raise
several problems which may be of constitutional importance.
J. Norman "Stoney" Stone petitioned the Wyoming Supreme Court
for admission to the bar without examination. His petition was referred
to the State Board of Law Examiners and a finding was made to the
effect that the applicant was not possessed of the requisite character
attributes necessary to become a member of the Wyoming bar. This
finding was affirmed by the Wyoming Supreme Court 4 During the
pendency of these proceedings the applicant sent copies of a letter to
Attorney General Herbert T. Brownell, to the Wyoming court and to
each member of the court individually. The applicant stated: "I indict
the... Supreme Court of Wyoming with having fomented a conspiracy
in concert to deprive me of my livelihood, wilfully, knowingly, mali-
ciously... 2" Also, the applicant sent a letter to the clerk of the Wyo-
ming court in which he said: "I accuse the Wyoming Supreme Court
of being unfair, prejudiced, partial and biased and am sure that I will
not get a fair hearing...."
On the basis of the above two letters the Attorney General of Wyo-
ming brought an action of criminal contempt against the applicant.
While the contempt action was pending the defendant sent several
I EDWARD M. DANGEL, NATIONAL LAWYmS'S MANUAL, "CONTEMPr" § 41 (1939).
2 CROMWELL HOLMES THOMAS, PROBLEMS OF CONTEMI'T OF COURT, 7 (1934).
3 ........ Wyo ......... 305 P.2d 777 (1957), cert. denied 17 C.C.H. U.S. Sup. Ct Bull. 699
(March 4, 1957).
4 Application of Stone, 74 Wyo. 389, 288 P.2d 767, cert. denied 352 U.S. 815 (1955),
71, 1 L.Ed.2d 68 (1955).
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other statements and letters to the court, some of them having been
published previously in his newspaper, "Stone's Shooting Star." In
addition, certain motions were filed by the defendant. In a motion for
jury trial and disqualification of certain supreme court judges, the
defendant cited letters he had received saying: "I know that bunch
of Legal Shysters in Wyoming who are also in the Supreme Court...."
In a motion for additional time in which to answer the contempt charge,
the defendant stated: "Defendant is busily engaged in a one-man truth
squad campaign for the defeat of Judge Glenn Parker of the Wyoming
Supreme Court who is a prejudiced individual.... He believes in
justice for the privileged few. If Judge Parker votes not to permit
this extension of 30 days the voters will be able to judge for himself
[sic] that he wants to jail defendant and shut him up as quickly as
possible so that he will not be able to tell the people the truth of what
is going on."
Defendant published in his paper and forwarded copies to the court
the following: "J. Norman Stone will present evidence of deceit,
fraud, libel, defamation of character, collusion, conspiracy and out-
right falsehoods by the... Wyoming Supreme Court...." Another
statement published by defendant and sent to the court indicated his
feeling that, "There is no doubt that the minds of the judges are
poisoned and that I have been found guilty of contempt long ago. This
trial is a mere formality.... The... judges of the Wyoming Supreme
Court are dangerous men and so long as they remain in power the free-
dom and even the lives of Wyoming citizens are not safe from jeopardy.
They do not respect the Bill of Rights of the U.S. Constitution and the
Wyoming Constitution and are ignorant of God's natural laws. They
are a disgrace to our way of life...."
For each of these outbursts the defendant was found guilty of a
direct contempt of the court after he had been allowed to obtain coun-
sel and have a hearing presided over by the same judges against whom
his comments were directed. The court sentenced him to six months
in the county jail and fined him $1000 with a provision that if the fine
were not paid an additional prison sentence of three months would be
imposed.'
DEFINITION OF TERmS
To understand fully the problems involved in the Stone case, as in
any contempt case, it is necessary to be familiar with the terms used
5 305 P.2d at 799.
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by the courts, and the significance that the courts attach to those terms.
First, a distinction must be made between criminal contempt and civil
contempt. A criminal contempt is prosecuted to preserve the power of
the court and to punish the offender. It consists of conduct that is
directed against the dignity and authority of the court. The punish-
ment in such a contempt is punitive and is meant to vindicate the
court's authority.' It is a contempt that involves the public interest
as opposed to civil contempt which involves a private interest only.T
A civil contempt consists of failing to do something which the con-
temnor is ordered to do by the court. The punishment in this type of
contempt is remedial, being for the benefit of a private complainant.!
The proceeding in the Stone case was to punish the defendant, and
the contempt citation was criminal in its nature. It is settled that trial
by jury does not extend to criminal contempts.9
Second, a more important distinction is found in the terms direct
and constructive contempts. Whether a contempt is designated to be
one or the other will have seriously constitutional implications, as will
be pointed out below. It should be noted that the court in the Stone
case expressly found that the defendant's statements amounted to a
direct contempt."
Direct contempts properly embrace only those acts of which the
court itself has personal knowledge, which take place in the presence
of the court or so near thereto as to interrupt the proceedings.1' Con-
duct in the presence of the court which tends to embarrass or obstruct
the court in administration of justice, or which tends to bring the admint
istration of law into disrespect, constitutes a direct contempt. 2 Also,
direct contempt has been defined as an insult committed in the presence
of the court, or of a judge when acting as such, or a resistance of, or
interference with, the lawful authority of a court or judge in his pres-
ence, or improper conduct so near to the court or judge acting judicially
as to interrupt or hinder judicial proceedings.' Constructive contempts,
on the other hand, are acts done, not in the presence of the court or
6 it re Kahn, 204 Fed. 581 (2nd Cir. 1913) ; Tucker v. State, 35 Wyo. 430, 251 Pac.
460 (1926).
7 EDWARD M. DANGEL, NATIONAL LAWYER'S MANUAL, "CoN'pT" § 12 (1939).
saId. § 12.
V In re Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888) ; Cooke v. U.S., 267 U.S. 517 (1925) ; Fisher v.
Pace, 336 U.S. 155 (1949) ; Doss v. Lindsley, 53 F. Supp. 427 (E.D. IIl. 1944) affd.
148 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1944).10 305 P.2d at 786.
11 CROMWELL, op. cil. supra note 2, at 3.
12 DANGLE, op. cit. supra note 7, § 198 at 96.
1" Id. § 7.
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judge, which tend to obstruct the administration of justice, or bring the
court or judge or the administration of justice into disrespect.14
THE BASIC ISSUE - DIRECT OR CONSTRUCTIVE?
Whether a particular contempt is direct or constructive will have
immediate constitutional consequences. It is well settled that the courts
have the inherent power to punish summarily for diredt contempts,5
and such procedure accords with the requirements of due process.'
But, in order for a court to punish for a constructive contempt, it must
meet other requirements if the defendant is to be afforded due process
of law. He must be given notice, opportunity to obtain counsel, and an
impartial hearing. 7
If the defendant in the Stone case was in direct contempt of the court
under the definitions as set out above, there is little doubt but that he
was afforded his constitutional rights of due process of law and freedom
of speech. The finding by the court that the statements of the defendant
which were "filed" with the Wyoming court constituted a direct con-
tempt is certainly open to question. It must be remembered that the
power to punish for direct contempt must rest on the importance of
protecting the judiciary from attacks which disrupt the proceedings of
the court and interfere with the orderly processes of justice. Only such
an obstruction can justify a court in summarily punishing a person for
his conduct. Also, it should be noted that this power completely dis-
regards what are thought of as being fundamental requisites of a free
society; that is, trial by jury, notice, impartial hearing, and freedom of
speech and press. To justify the exercise of the power the act must
take place within the personal knowledge of the judge so that there will
be no necessity to have a hearing and introduction of evidence. 8 It is
generally believed that the act complained of as being a direct contempt
must have the character of immediately disrupting the orderly proc-
esses of justice or be likely to do so. While the words of the defendant
in the present case were certainly intemperate, it is clear that the
vehemance of words does not determine whether a contempt is subject
to summary process. 9 The crucial question in the Stone case therefore,
:4Id. § 5.
15 See Frankfurter dissent in Bridges v. State of California, 314 U.S. 252, 279 (1941);
Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505 (1874) ; Cooke v. U.S., and Fisher v. Pace, supra note
9; State v. Bland, 189 Mo. 197, 88 S.W. 28 (1905).
'a Cooke v. U.S., Fisher v. Pace, supra note 9. See Sacher v. U.S., 343 U.S. 1
(1952) (Frankfurter dissenting opinion).
17 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) ; In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
18 Cooke v. U.S., supra, note 9; In re Oliver, supra note 17.
19 Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
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is whether the acts done by the defendant were within the presence of
the court and were of a character which were likely to disrupt the
orderly proceedings of justice, thereby requiring the exercise of this
summary process of punishment.
The vast majority of the cases dealing with the direct contempt
process concern acts done by the defendant in the actual presence of
the court and during proceedings of a case in open court. In the Stone
case the defendant was never physically present at the time the pur-
ported acts of misconduct constituting direct contempt took place. Also,
it might be questioned whether, even if it be found that the misconduct
was within the presence of the court, that misconduct reasonably would
have been likely to disrupt the orderly process of justice.
Before deciding whether the filed statements of the defendant in the
Stone case amounted to a direct or a constructive contempt, let us
assume the latter is the correct determination, and investigate the likely
consequences from such a finding.
FREE SPEECH AND THE "CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TEST"
The "clear and present danger test" is a restriction on absolute free-
dom of speech and was first adopted by the Supreme Court in 1919 in
Sckenck v. United States,"0 an espionage case. Although the test had
been applied in other types of cases involving the freedom of speech it
was not until the case of Bridges v. California and its companion case,
Times-Mirror Company v. Superior Court of State of California,21 that
the court considered its application in a criminal contempt proceeding.
In both cases the contempts committed were clearly constructive. In
the Times-Mirror case the acts complained of constituted publication
of adverse editorials regarding certain actions pending before a Cal-
ifornia state court. The United States Supreme Court found that the
power as exercised by the California court was not justified, and that
only when the acts complained of constituted a "clear and present dan-
ger" to the orderly workings of the judiciary would the court be justi-
fied in punishing them as constructive contempts. Justice Frankfurter
wrote a vigorous dissent in which he stated:
Since courts are the ultimate resorts for vindicating the Bill of Rights,
a state may surely authorize appropriate historic means to assure that
the process for such vindication be not wrenched from its rational
tracks into the more primitive m~l&e of passion and pressure. The
20249 U.S. 47 (1919).
21 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
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need is great that the courts be criticized but just as great that they be
allowed to do their duty.22
Other cases have considered the application of the "clear and present
danger test" to contempt prosecutions. In Pennekamp v. Florida," the
United States Supreme Court reversed the Florida Supreme Court when
it affirmed a lower state court finding of contempt. The contempt in-
volved there was constructive. The importance of the Pennekamp case
is in the Court's indication that it will look into the facts to determine
whether there actually was a clear and present danger as the Court sees
the matter and will not be bound by such a finding by a state court.24
The court in the Stone case is, it seems, anticipating a possible deter-
mination by the United States Supreme Court that the contempt was
constructive, and to insure against a reversal, has made an express
finding that "... . the statements and utterances.., constituted a clear
and present danger to the administration of justice in the State of Wyo-
ming."" The Pennekamp case makes it clear that the insurance may
not be adequate.26
Craig v. Harney27 was another constructive contempt case wherein
the Court applied the clear and present danger test. It was there held
that a publication, while a motion for a new trial was pending, of an
unfair report of the facts of a civil case, accompanied by intemperate
criticism of the judge's conduct was protected by the Constitution.
From these three cases-the Bridges case, the Pennekamp case, and
the Craig case-it is clear that the power of a court (state or federal)
to punish for constructive contempt is limited by the Constitutional
right of freedom of speech and press. To override this right it must be
shown that the statements complained of are such as would constitute
a "clear and present danger" to the orderly administration of justice.
22 314 U.S. at p. 284.
23328 U.S. 331 (1946).
24 ".. . we are compelled to examine for ourselves the statements in issue and the
circumstances under which they were made to see whether or not they do carry a
threat of clear and present danger to the impartiality and good order of the courts or
whether they are of a character which the principles of the First Amendment, protect.
When the highest court of a state has reached a determination upon such an issue, we
give most respectful attention to its reasoning and conclusion but its authority is not
final." 328 U.S. at p. 335.
25 305 P.2d at p. 792.
20 There are some intimations that under the right of free speech the right to criticize
judicial action has a greater scope where the judiciary is elective. See Pennekamp v.
Florida (concurring opinion per Rutledge), 328 U.S. at p. 370.
27 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
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OTHER DUE PROCESS ARGUMENTS
A court's finding that there is a "clear and present danger" to the
orderly administration of justice as a justification for punishment for
constructive contempts may not insure a conviction for reasons apart
from the independent investigation of the facts by the Supreme Court.
Where a constructive contempt is being prosecuted, due process of law
requires notice, opportunity to obtain counsel and an impartial hear-
ing." In the Stone case the defendant had the first two of these. He
was also given a hearing, but whether the defendant could have obtained
a fair and impartial hearing before the very judges to whom he directed
his contemptuous remarks is highly improbable. The Supreme Court
has made it unequivocally clear that in constructive contempts the hear-
ing must be an impartial one before a judge different from the one
against whom the contempt was committed. 9
The importance of the distinction between constructive contempt and
direct contempt should be quite apparent. The punishment inflicted
upon the defendant in the Stone case must rest alone on the finding of
direct contempt. The express finding by the Wyoming court that the
filed statements of the defendant constituted a ". . . clear and present
danger to the administration of justice in the State of Wyoming,' 80
does not alone sustain the court in punishing on the basis of a con-
structive contempt. That determination is always open to review by
the Supreme Court and, even if that fact were true, the defendant was
not afforded due process of law because he probably could not have
been given the required impartial hearing.
Because of the significant constitutional differences between direct
contempt and constructive contempt, it becomes imperative to the
Wyoming court's position in the Stone case to determine whether its
finding of a direct contempt was accurate. The closest United States
Supreme Court case on its facts to the Stone case is Cooke v. United
States." A lower federal court found the defendant, Cooke, guilty of
contempt in sending a contemptuous personal letter to the judge in his
chambers, and summarily punished him. The Tenth Circuit Court
affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the de-
fendant had been denied due process of law. There was in effect at this
time a federal statute setting out the power of a lower federal court to
2. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
29 See note 28, supra.
10 305 P.2d at p. 792.
31267 U.S. 517 (1925).
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punish for contempt. 2 That statute stated that "Such power to punish
contempts shall not be construed to extend to any cases except the
misbehavior of any person in their presence, or so near thereto as to
obstruct the administration of justice.. ." The Court found that though
the letter was contemptuous it was not within the presence of the court
which was necessary to allow summary punishment. In other words,
the Court found that a contemptuous letter sent to a judge in his cham-
bers was not a direct contempt permitting the summary process, and
that a due process hearing must be had before the defendant could be
punished for the contempt.
The Wyoming court disposes of the Cooke case quite summarily and
possibly without adequate consideration of its importance. In referring
to the Cooke decision, it says: "Mr. Chief Justice Taft ... held the
letter was contemptuous and the offense had been committed in the
presence of the court, although not 'in open court' so as to permit sum-
mary punishment without a hearing." (Emphasis by the Wyoming
court.) The Wyoming court emphasizes the words "without a hearing"
when it cites the Cooke decision.3 This evidently is the basis upon
which the court distinguishes the Cooke decision from their case; that
is, Stone was given a hearing while Cooke was not. But the court over-
looks one vital factor; namely, that a prejudicial hearing is no hearing
at all, and as has been pointed out above, a defendant in a criminal
proceeding for constructive contempt is not afforded due process of law
where the same judges against whom the contempt was directed sit as
judges of that proceeding. 4
If the Cooke decision is to be dismissed as not controlling the Stone
case, it must be done on other grounds. It might be suggested that a
distinction lies in the fact that the Cooke case involved federal courts
alone and a limiting federal statute, while the Stone case concerns the
power of a state court with no limiting statute. This, of course, raises
the question of whether the requirements for due process in a contempt
32 The statute as it then read is as follows:
"Title 28 USC 385 (Judicial Code 268) Administration of Oaths; Contempts-
The said courts shall have power to impose and administer all necessary oaths, and to
punish, by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of the court, contempts of their author-
ity. Such power to punish contempts shall not be construed to extend to any cases
except the misbehavior-of any person in their presence, or so near thereto as to obstruct
the administration of justice, the misbehavior of any of the officers of said courts in
their official transactions, and the disobedience or resistence by any such officers or by
any party, juror, witness, or other person to any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree,
or command of the said courts."
For the present day language of this statute see Title 18 USCA § 401.
39 305 P.2d at p. 785.
34 See supra note 28.
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proceeding are less strict in a state court than they are in a federal
court. The Bridges case seems to put this question at rest. The Court
carefully pointed out in that case:
To be sure, the exercise of power here in question was by a state judge.
But in deciding whether or not the sweeping constitutional mandate
against any law 'abridging the freedom of speech or of the press' for-
bids it, we are necessarily measuring a power of all American courts,
both state and federal ... 35
The Wyoming court cites the case of Owens v. Dancy8 wherein the
Tenth Circuit Court affirmed a lower federal court decision of summary
punishment for contempt consisting of remarks made by the defendant
in a pleading. Certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court. The Cooke
decision is substantially ignored. But the Owens case might be distin-
guished from the Cooke case in the same manner that the Stone case
can be distinguished from the Cooke case as set out below.
In both the Owens case and the Stone case the contemptuous remarks
are made in statements or pleadings filed with the court. In the Cooke
case, however, there was a personal letter sent, not to the court, but
to the judge in his chambers. This could be a valid basis for distinction.
The Cooke case found a constructive contempt which requires a due
process hearing, while in the Owens and the Stone cases there were
direct contempts which could be punished summarily without regard
for the usual requisites of due process of law.
Just as the Supreme Court will make an independent examination of
the issues underlying an application of the "clear and present danger"
doctrine, so too will it make an independent examination to see that
the facts actually support a finding of direct contempt. In Fisher v.
Pace,3' a case involving a direct contempt, the Court stated that in
order to accord with due process, a summary conviction for contempt
must be supported by adequate facts. 8 Generally, it can be said that
a finding of a direct contempt which results in summary punishment
rests in the sound discretion of the court, and a reversal will'be
occasioned only for gross abuse of that discretion. But, as the Fisher
case illustrates, due process considerations cannot be completely
avoided merely because the state or lower federal court finds that the
contempt committed was direct as was the finding in the Stone case.
31 314 U.S. at p. 260. But cf. State v. Gussman, 34 N.J. Super. 408, 112 A.2d 565
(1955).36 36 F.2d 882 (10th Cir. 1929).
3 336 U.S. 155 (1949).38 336 U.S. at p. 160.
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However, the possibility of obtaining a reversal of a determination of
guilt for direct contempt because of due process reasons (other than
that of freedom of speech and press) is a much more difficult task than
where the contempt punished is a constructive one.
If the issue raised by the defendant in a direct contempt proceeding
is that he was deprived of his first amendment freedoms, the possibility
of a reversal would appear, at this time, to be perceptibly more unlikely
than the case where the contempt is constructive. The question is not
settled by any means. There is only one Supreme Court case that has
considered the challenge that in a direct contempt proceeding the
defendant was denied his constitutional right of freedom of speech,
Fisher v. Pace.3" The court held that where the contempt was readily
observable by the presiding judge, and where it constituted an open and
immediate threat to orderly judicial procedure and to the court's
authority, the offended tribunal was constitutionally empowered to
punish summarily. It should be noted that this was a 5-4 decision. The
court in the Fisher case concerned itself primarily with a determination
of whether the defendant had been afforded due process of law where
he had been found guilty of a direct contempt without a formal hearing.
As has been noted above, 0 the court decided that such a hearing was
not necessary.
All other Supreme Court cases raising the question of denial of a
constitutional right to freedom of speech and press have involved con-
structive contempts. The Bridges case, which is the leading case in the
application of the "clear and present danger" doctrine to constructive
contempts, was a 5-4 decision. The dissent, led by Justice Frankfurter,
felt that the first amendment freedoms should not outweigh the power
of a court to punish for a constructive contempt. The decision of the
majority in this case did not go so far as to restrict the power of a court
to punish for direct contempts. The court stated that both the state
and the federal courts have the power to protect themselves from
disturbances and disorders in the courtroom by use of contempt pro-
ceedings, and that power cannot be challenged as conflicting with con-
stitutionally secured guarantees of liberty. The Pennekamp decision
reiterates this view, and Mr. Justice Frankfurter, a dissenter in the
Bridges case, wrote a concurring opinion in the Pennekamp case which
serves to strengthen further the court's authority in this regard.4
39 Supra, note 37.
40 Supra, note 9.
41 328 U.S. at p. 350.
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CONCLUSION
The problems involved in the Stone case are difficult. A decision
cannot be based on legal precedent alone. The underlying policy
considerations must be given weight as well. It is submitted that the
Wyoming court's finding-that the motion filed by the defendant for
additional time to answer the contempt charge constituted a direct
contempt-was a correct determination under the holding of the Owens
case,42 and was properly punished summarily.
The constitutional rights of a defendant must be balanced with the
necessity of preserving order and dignity of the judicial process. The
statements of the defendant in the Stone case were uncalled for, to say
the least. He was, as the Wyoming court said in their affirmance of
the Board of Law Examiners' decision, "... evidently disposed to
improperly try [sic] the matter pending in this court before the
public."" The motion that was filed requesting the additional time
restricts and interferes with the orderly disposition of justice in that
it places upon the judges, who are to decide the propriety of that
motion, considerations which should not be a part of a fair and
impartial disposition." As Justice Frankfurter so aptly put it in his
concurring opinion in the Pennekamp case, "A judiciary is not inde-
pendent unless courts of justice are enabled to administer law by
absence of pressure from without, whether exerted through the blan-
dishments of rewards or the menace of disfavor.""
The purpose... is not to protect the court as a mystical entity or
the judges as individuals or as anointed priests set apart from the com-
munity and spared the criticism to which in a democracy other public
servants are exposed. The purpose is to protect immediate litigants
and the public from the mischievous danger of an unfree or coerced
tribunal.46
If the judiciary of this country is to remain independent of thought
and free from coerced opinion and to continue as the guardian of all
4,Owens v. Dancy, 36 F2d 882 (10th Cir. 1929). The contemptuous remarks made
by the defendant in this case were contained in a "motion for leave to file... a petition
for rehearing." It was there alleged "that to determine this case ... without judicial
consideration... and without the knowledge on the part of the justices participating in
said decision ... was a legal fraud against the rights of these movants,".
43 74 Wyo. 389, 393, 288 P2d 767, 771 (1955).
44 The defendant included in his motion for an additional thirty days in which to
answer, the following language:
"If Judge Parker votes not to permit this extension of 30 days the voters will be able
to judge for himself [sic] that he wants to jail defendant and shut him up as quickly as
possible so that he will not be able to tell the people the truth of what is going on."
45 328 U.S. at p. 3 5 5 .
46 314 U.S. at p. 291 (dissenting opinion per Frankfurter).
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our constitutional rights, the power of summary punishment for con-
tempt as exercised by the Wyoming Supreme Court in the Stone case
should not be limited. The best assurance of a sound discretionary use
of that power without abuse is to guard carefully against all attacks on
the independence of the judiciary from whatever source; any recourse
remaining in the hands of a free and informed electorate.
